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BOOK REVIEW
PRIVATE CONTROL OF COLLECTIVE
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Zoning and Property Rights, By Robert H. Nelson. Cambridge,
Mass.: the MIT Press, 1977. Pp. xi, 259.
No other issue in the area of land use control has generated as
much controversy as "the taking issue."' Legal theorists,2 lawyer-
economists,' and would-be lawyer-philosophers' have all attempted
to elucidate the appropriate limits of police power regulation since
Justice Holmes first revealed the presence, but not the extent, of a
limit in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.' No legally satisfactory, ef-
ficient, and equitable solution has been forthcoming.
Thus, it came as no surprise when nonlawyer-economist Robert
H. Nelson surveyed the literature on zoning and land use and found
"[m]ost of the discussions . . . unenlightening."' However, what did
come as a surprise was the fact that Professor Nelson chose to supply
enlightenment not of the bothersome taking problem alone, but of
the "broad" objectives of zoning altogether. While the result of
Nelson's effort is something less than a complete history of zoning
law's "greatest successes and failures,' 7 the book does contain an in-
triguing proposal for reform and some valuable insights on the
underlying purpose of zoning.
For the uninitiated who desire unenlightenment, the taking
issue is, to use Professor Nelson's terminology, one of zoning's
1. See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN. D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973);
Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 165 (1974);
Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (1958);
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
Just Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings, Private Property
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
2. See Sax, supra note 1.
3. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973).
4. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).
5. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Justice Holmes stated: "The general rule at least is,
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415.
6. R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS xi (1977).
7. Id.
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"greatest failures." The issue originates with the Fifth Amend-
ment's mandate that "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation."8 Regrettably the Fifth Amendment
antedated the widespread use of zoning' or its sanctioning as con-
stitutional, 10 and hence, the only thing anyone can be absolutely sure
of is that if the government decides that your prime residential
waterfront property would make an ideal park and community
center, and the government physically constructs such thereon, com-
pensation should be forthcoming." The matter becomes complicated,
however, if the government merely rezones your property to "open
space," a use classification which permits fishing, beachcombing, and
cabana-leasing, but unfortunately not the. multi.-family condominium
you were thinking of constructing. In this latter case, compensation
will generally not be forthcoming, even though your property has
suffered a decline in value from $500,000 to $5,000.2 After all the
rezoning not only permits a reasonable beneficial use (all the fish
you can catch), but also leaves your fee simple title undisturbed.
Unless the waterfront property is in Missouri' 13 the best you can
8. U.S. CONST. amend V.
9. The first zoning ordinance has been traced to a Napoleonic decree of 1810.
See J. METZENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING 12 (1955). Zoning in America was patterned after
the late nineteenth century experience in Germany, id., and the first com-
prehensive ordinance was that adopted by New York City in 1916. 1 R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.07, 43 (1968).
10. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
11. Professor Berger comments:
In general, damages have been limited to cases where a physical act of
the government has caused injury to the property of the owner .... In
the past it has not been the practice of courts to allow damages in a case
where governmental regulation . . .has caused the injury. In such cases
the usual remedy has been a holding that the regulation was invalid and
unenforceable.
Berger, supra note 1, at 165, 170 n.15.
12. The land in the Euclid decision was in the path of progressive industrial
development. When rezoned to permit only residential uses the market value of the
land depreciated 75% -significant, but not enough, to sustain a claim of compensation.
The Supreme Court recently upheld a landmark preservation ordinance in New York,
holding inter alia that "diminution in property value, standing alone, can [not) establish
a taking." Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2663,
reh. den., 99 S. Ct. 226 (1978) (citing Euclid). But cf. Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 51
Cal. App. 3d 901, 124 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1975).
13. Missouri statutes authorize ordinances providing for zoning with compen-
sation. See City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969). In America zon-
ing compensation statutes are rare. However, Professor Hagman has devised an
elaborate windfall recapture/wipeout mitigation proposal which would recoup the in-
creases in value to some property precipitated by land use controls and apply such
recaptured value to properties adversely affected by land use decisions. See D.
HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS (1978).
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hope for is to have the rezoning invalidated as an unreasonable or
confiscatory exercise of the police power not furthering the public
health, safety and welfare, although this hope is very often a slim
one."
At this juncture most legal scholars have been taken in by the
complexity of the taking issue, and have sought to identify the legal
theory which reconciles the apparent inequity in the above example
and countless real-life tragedies like it. Mr. Bosselman argues that
the Constitution should be strictly construed in accordance with the
intent of the founding fathers as not including a requirement of com-
pensation for land use control measures. 5 Professor Berger would
award compensation, but only if the landowner did not know and
should not have expected the detrimental regulation;"6 Professor Sax
may suggest that whether the government is acting in its enter-
priser or arbitrator capacity would determine compensation;" and
Professor Ackerman will inquire as to the credentials of the judge
as either an ordinary observer or scientific policymaker, for only if
the judge is of the latter stripe will he be able to evaluate the claim
of compensation in terms of the applicable comprehensive view. 8
Some serious scholars have surveyed the morass, and have told us
that it can be resolved only with an "alternative to zoning"" or by
eliminating zoning altogether."0
14. See, e.g., Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of
Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake,
60 Wis. 2d 640, 211 N.W.2d 471 (1973).
15. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, supra note 1, at 318-22 (1973).
16. Berger, supra note 1, at 223-26.
17. In one article Professor Sax suggested that if the government enterprise
is enhanced by a land use regulation, a taking has occurred; but when the government
merely resolves a land use conflict by regulation, a taking has not occurred and no
compensation need be paid. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
In a later article, Professor Sax took a more restrictive position indicating that the
need to protect public rights precludes compensation except where the land use being
regulated has no conflict-creating spillover effects. Since virtually every land use
creates spillover, little compensation is required under the second Sax theory. Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
18. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 4. "Policymaking" and "observing" are alter-
native approaches to legal problems. The policymaker believes that the legal system is
organized around the principles of a comprehensive view; the observer believes the
legal system should vindicate the practices and expectations of dominant social institu-
tions. "Scientific" and "ordinary" refer to the legal language: the scientist believes that
legal language consists of technical concepts set in relation to one another; the or-
dinary analyst requires that legal language be perceived in relation to the talk of non-
lawyers. Ackerman argues that only the scientific policymaker can hope to resolve the
internal confusion present in modern land use decisions.
19. Ellickson, supra note 3.
20. B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972); B. SIEGAN, OTHER PEOPLES
19791
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Initially, Nelson is unfettered by the taking thicket, such that
his first efforts are devoted to uncovering the real basis of zoning.
In Chapter One, Nelson surveys zoning law's nuisance prevention
justification and finds it wanting. To Nelson, justifying zoning with a
nuisance rationale is merely a prerequisite to zoning's constitu-
tionality. Property rights in America have always been subject to
"limits . . . authorized as being appropriate police powers of the
state." 1 The problem, as Nelson correctly points out, is that from
the very beginning many land uses subject to zoning regulation
were not in fact nuisances.' Most importantly viewing zoning as
merely nuisance prevention obscures what Nelson considers to be
zoning's primary purpose: the protection of neighborhood quality."
Even with the constitutionality of zoning ensured, however, the
nuisance rationale lingers. The portrayal of zoning as a reason-
able means of preventing or controlling nuisances obscures not only
zoning's unarticulated purpose, but also the taking issue. A judicial
finding that a particular ordinance is a police power function related
to the protection of the health, safety and welfare has generally
meant ipso facto that compensation need not be paid. However, the
failure of the courts to require and sometimes even consider com-
pensation claims, even in cases of highly restrictive zoning, ' does
not concern Nelson as it has concerned so many others. 5 It becomes
increasingly apparent that Nelson is in pursuit of a land use control
mechanism that promotes allocational efficiency, not necessarily
allocational fairness.
Under Nelson's analysis, "zoning divides control of the use of
land, and thus the property rights to that land, between the per-
sonal owner and the local government .... [Z]oning in effect creates
collective property rights that are held by local government."" In
this regard Nelson's analysis can be compared with the theory of en-
titlements suggested by Calabresi and Melamed. 7 While the entitle-
PROPERTY (1976); THE INTERACTION OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (B. Siegan ed. 1977).
21. R. NELSON. supra note 6, at 7.
22. Id. at 10-11. For example, in Euclid, Justice Sutherland characterized an
apartment house-which is generally not a noxious, dangerous or immoral use in the
nuisance sense-as "a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the
open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the
district. Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed by others.
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
23. R. NELSON. supra note 6, at 11.
24. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
25. See generally the articles cited in note 1, supra.
26. R. NELSON, supra note 6, at 1.
27. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedra4 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). Under the Calabresi and
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ment (a certain parcel of land) is protected by a "property rule," the
entitlement itself is shared between the local government and the
individual owner, and thereby has two dimensions: one personal and
one collective. Nelson chooses to describe zoning as a collective prop-
erty right to facilitate his subsequent proposal for zoning reform. At
present, however, it is enough to note that this description too
avoids but does not answer the taking question.
Assuming zoning is a collective property right, and not merely
a manifestation of the police power, how is this collective right exer-
cised? "[I]n all except a very few instances, local legislatures can be
counted on to follow the residents' wishes in administering the zon-
ing of a neighborhood,"' says Nelson. The wish of most residents, of
course, is to maintain a neighborhood of high quality, a wish that
would remain unfulfilled, according to Nelson, without zoning.
A growing number of land use students would quarrel with the
proposition that zoning is a prerequsitie to the maintenance of
neighborhood quality.' Many counties in Florida, Texas, Missouri,
Illinois, Iowa, and Indiana have never adopted zoning ordinances"°
and available evidence suggests that nonzoned areas are not only in-
distinguishable in many respects from their zoned counterparts, but
also, because of their greater flexibility, better able to accommodate
development, transition, and redevelopment pressure." How do
these nonzoned areas maintain neighborhood quality? Primarily by
allowing land to be allocated in accordance with the normal
economic forces of the market place. Neighborhood quality is main-
tained since industry finds land prices too costly adjacent to residen-
Melamed analysis, the legal system is called upon to make a first order decision: whom
to entitle to a certain right or interest when the rights of two or more people conflict;
and a second order decision: how to protect the entitlement once it is conferred. An
entitlement can be protected by: a property rule, such that "someone who wishes to
remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transac-
tion," id. at 1092; a liability rule, when someone may remove or destroy the entitle-
ment by paying an objectively determined value for it, id., or an inalienability rule,
where the entitlement cannot be transferred. Id, Nelson suggests that by means of the
zoning ordinance, the legal system has split the entitlement to private property be-
tween the owner and local government. Nelson's proposal for reform discussed infra
advocates that the local government entitlement, which is presently protected by an
inalienability rule, be redistributed to a neighborhood association and protected by a
property rule.
28. R. NELSON. supra note 6, at 16. However, for a number of reasons public
regulators may misperceive resident wishes, see note 41 infra and accompanying text.
29. See generally the articles cited in notes 3 & 20 supra.
30. THE INTERACTION OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 159 (B. Siegan ed. 1977).
31. Id.
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tial subdivisions, and commercial enterprises such as gas stations
and shopping centers, find locating on interior streets away from
major thoroughfares less than ideal from the standpoint of profit
maximization. Secondarily, and to a much smaller extent, nonzoned
areas employ private land use controls such as restrictive covenants
to assure neighborhood quality. 2
In response to those who argued for private land use control,
Nelson asserts that private covenants are feasible only where an en-
tire neighborhood is assembled under single ownership prior to its
development. Obtaining agreement on the content of such covenants
in an existing neighborhood "would be very difficult-if not impossi-
ble."3 Thus, in order to deal with the "unwilling"-those who refuse
to accept neighborhood quality, or who have a different conception
of it-Nelson would impose zoning, "a form of coercion that would
not be possible using private methods."'
While Nelson's argument pertaining to the creation of private
covenants is generally accurate, insofar as hold-outs and transaction
costs may be significant obstacles to establishing private controls in
an existing neighborhood, the statement does not inexorably
establish either the need or desirability for zoning. Nelson fails to
address the assurance of neighborhood quality provided by the
marketplace itself or to acknowledge the fact that covenants, as he
admits zoning to be, are merely reflective of market demand. Most
disturbingly, Nelson tacitly accepts the infringement on individual
liberty that is involved in coercing the unwilling property owner.
Without acknowledging the coercive element present in zoning,
Nelson compares collective property rights to the undivided owner-
ship and management of common elements in a condominium.
However, insofar as condominium ownership is undertaken volun-
tarily, with full knowledge of the terms contained in the con-
dominium declaration, the analogy is simply false.
Is Nelson aware of zoning's infringement on individual rights?
Apparently. In his own words, "The collective rights created by zon-
ing are inconsistent with basic American beliefs. Americans have
traditionally placed a very high value on individual freedom .... "3
Moreover, Nelson admits that it is primarily because zoning so
drastically infringes upon personal independence that courts require
32. In Houston the most notable example of nonzoning, only 10 to 15 percent
of vacant land is subject to restrictive covenants. I& at 162.
33. R. NELSON, supra note 6, at 17.
34. Id
35. Id at 119-20.
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zoning to be strictly limited to police power purposes." Yet accord-
ing to Nelson, Americans also treasure highly homogeneous neighbor-
hoods, and the desire for homogeneity and economic segregation has
been well served by zoning. For this reason the infringement of
liberty entailed by zoning is seldom legally acknowledged, and
"[z]oning [is] supported by fictions, evasions, contrived arguments,
and other dodging of the fundamental issues . . . ."I' As before, with
reference to the compensation question, Nelson appears unphased
by this decline of individual rights. Indeed, Nelson peers into his
crystal ball and finds that "in future social systems personal rights
may be increasingly superseded by collective rights.""
The core problem in Nelson's view is not that the individual is
trampled by collective society (the classic taking fact situation), but
that small segments of collective society- neighborhoods- do not
have the right to sell the collective rights created by zoning. In this
regard Nelson finds zoning to be the modern-day equivalent of
feudalism: as the lord of the manor could only manage, but not sell
the manor, so too local governments can only administer, but not
sell zoning rights. 9 Unlike private covenants which can be sold in
response to an attractive development offer, zoning rights are not a
salable commodity, and hence beneficial neighborhood transition is
forestalled. Thus, Nelson indicates that while he is quite willing to
give priority to collective rights, he is not at all satisfied with the
existing public control of those rights. Zoning's success is the pro-
tection of neighborhood quality through a collective right; zoning's
failure is the public administration of those rights.
Public control of zoning results in land use inefficiencies
because such control is frequently out of line with private demand.
For example, large-lot zoning is utilized as a growth or income bar-
rier, even though the practice often results in urban sprawl with ex-
tended municipal boundaries and attendant fiscal burdens for road
and utility extension.' These aberrational land use decisions are
36. Id.
37. Id. at 121.
38. Id at 119.
39. Some public land use decisions are sold illicitly, however. In this regard,
Nelson comments: "Public control of land use has worked so poorly that it has had to
be regularly subverted by developer political intrigues, corruption, and other unsavory
practices." Ld. at 190.
40. Nelson suggests that these allocational inefficiencies are likely to become
more glaring as "[ejconomically, it will not make sense to locate moderate- and high-
density housing far out in suburban fringes that are removed from existing centers of
activity." Id. at 176.
1979]
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made because public officials fail to adequately perceive the private
demands existing in individual neighborhoods, and respond instead
to the political pressure of organized, rather than diffused, interests
or constituent concerns that fail to adequately weigh the costs and
benefits of development proposals made by outsiders.' Nelson also
suggests that "regulators have shown a frequent willingness to
sacrifice greater long-term benefits to avoid short-term pains."'"
Since public regulators misperceive the wants of the regulated,
"there is little reason for not giving administrative control over
neighborhood protections [zoning] to the group in whose interest
these protections are exercised."'"
To replace public control, Nelson proposes a private land tenure
instrument, the neighborhood association." Ideally, the jurisdiction of
a neighborhood association would be determined by private agree-
ment or less ideally, by local government fiat, but in either case, the
association should be "several blocks" of similar uses or social
character."' The collective rights established by zoning would be
transferred to the association and individual owners within the
neighborhood would be assigned "shares" of equal value or based
upon property value, floor space or a combination thereof.' The
primary function of the neighborhood association would be to
evaluate and respond to development proposals for the neighbor-
hood. A reasonably high majority vote would be necessary to sell
collective rights," the sale proceeds being divided among the
members in accordance with a formula based on share value.
Development proposals for individual neighborhood sites, or entire
neighborhoods, would be possible." In either case the developer
41. Id. at 191-92.
42. Id
43. Id. at 174.
44. Id. at 207.
45. Id. at 209.
46. Id. at 213.
47. Nelson suggests a vote of 75% or higher. Id. at 179.
48. Nelson prefers the entire neighborhood approach since this will avoid
piecemeal redevelopment or transition which could hinder other neighborhoods, com-
prehensive private restructuring of the neighborhood, and the public planning of
schools, roads, and sewage facilities. While Nelson's preference for entire
neighborhood, rather than site-by-site, transition has theoretical merit, it may not be
practical in terms of the structure of most land development firms. Historically, land
development firms, while numerous, have been small-scale site operations, without the
managerial size, capital, and production capacity necessary to carry out the redevelop-
ment of an area approximating the size of a neighborhood in Nelson's terms. See E.
RACHLIS & J. MARQUSEE. THE LANDLORDS 37-40 (1963). In this regard the National
Association of Home Builders currently boasts of a membership in excess of 110,000
builder organizations.
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would still have to purchase the non-collective, existing use, or what
Nelson calls "personal rights," from the affected individual owners.
However, where an entire neighborhood scheme was accepted by
the majority, "the minority that voted against acceptance of an offer
would still be required to abide by the majority decision."49 In
essence, like local government, neighborhood associations would not
only control collective rights but also have the power of eminent do-
main over the "personal rights" of the minority; unlike local govern-
ment, neighborhood associations would exercise collective rights and
compel the sale of personal rights in response to private incentives,
rather than on the basis of the police power.
Prima facie, Nelson's land tenure instrument exceeds the scope
of any existing land use control device. First, as mentioned previously,
Nelson compares his proposal to homeowner associations and con-
dominiums. However, because of the involuntary establishment of
collective (zoning) rights upon which Nelson's system is premised,
the comparison to voluntary collectivities is somewhat misleading.
The comparison is further weakened by the fact that the principal
concern of homeowner associations and condominium management
boards is the governance and maintenance of common elements, and
not the personal rights of individual owners.5 Second, by removing
the veil of the police power and recharacterizing zoning as a private
collective right, one suspects that Nelson's proposal will be assailed
as a restraint on alienation."1 However, the policy against restraints
on alienation is wedded to the common belief that all development
rights are controlled by the individual owner, subject only to police
power limitations. If one assumes that zoning is a collective right
which is not within the control of individual owners, as Nelson does,
the restraint on alienation argument becomes inapposite by defini-
tion. The individual has his personal rights" which he is free to sell
at any time, subject possibly to a right of first refusal in the
neighborhood association.'
49. R. NELSON. supra note 6, at 179.
50. G. LEFCOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW 726 (1974).
51. Provisions in condominium and homeowner association by-laws restricting
the ability of members to convey their interest in property have been denied enforce-
ment. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 304
(1971).
52. To use the original waterfront property example, the personal rights in-
clude fishing, beachcombing, and cabana leasing, and the collective rights include ever-
thing else.
53. R. NELSON, supra note 6, at 214. While Nelson does not state it clearly, he
presumably would allow an individual to sell at any time not only his personal rights,
but also the inchoate value of his share interest in any collective rights-held by the
1979]
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At last it is apparent why Nelson did not set out to specifically
resolve the taking problem: under his proposal, property is no
longer taken for public use, the event allegedly requiring compensa-
tion under the Fifth Amendment; property is taken for private use.
Unfortunately the sleight of hand is not a resolution of the problem.
Private collective takings could potentially infringe individual liberty
as much as public takings." Is Nelson troubled by this? Hardly. The
taking problem relates merely to equity which, in Nelson's view, is
"a transitional concerni." The Fifth Amendment "goes beyond equi-
ty .. . to the fundamental question of who should hold development
rights."' Those who argue for private control of development rights
demand compensation; those who would place control in the public
sector do not. It is as simple as that.
Since Nelson finesses the compensation question, the only re-
maining issue becomes private versus public control of the use of
land. Public control means public planning, a concept that
represents another one of zoning's "greatest failures." Nelson
discusses some of the problems associated with public planning in
Chapter 3, and finds as others have, that "[tihe history of comp-
rehensive public land-use planning in this country is in fact one of an
almost total lack of influence."57 As Professor Robert Ellickson has
commented:
In a world of perfect information and infallible civil ser-
vants, [state master planning] would be as good an ap-
proach as any. But in the real world-where people hold
sharply conflicting values, where technological change
outstrips the imagination of science fiction writers, and
where civil servants may be uninformed or subject to cor-
ruption-the centralized master planning of the use of
widely scattered resources is likely to impair rather than
augment human welfare.'
Nelson correctly observes that whether development rights are pur-
chased by the government (the English practice)" or rezoned out of
neighborhood association. Collective rights, themselves, can be transferred only by the
association.
54. See generally Kristol, On Corporate Capitalism in America, 41 PUB. INT.
124, 131 (1973).
55. R. NELSON, supra note 6, at 217.
56. Id at 218.
57. Id at 65.
58. Ellickson, Ticket to Thermidor: Commentary on the Proposed California
Coastal Plan, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 715, 735 (1976).
59. The English system is described in D. HAGMAN, supra note 51, at 590-649;
see also D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 13, at 285-89.
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existence without compensation (the American practice), public plan-
ning is essentially a "no growth" or "negative" approach. Public con-
trol or ownership of development rights can prevent development,
but cannot assure that publicly desired development will occur."
Unfortunately, despite the failure of public planning, only right-
thinking people acknowledge that the allocation of development
rights in accordance with private competition in the land market is
superior to allocations made pursuant to public decision-making. As
a result, Nelson's reform proposal is not likely to be the first piece
of legislation introduced into the state legislature next session.
The fact that individual liberty and equity are effectively ig-
nored"' depreciates Nelson's analysis, especially in view of the con-
siderable legal scholarship dedicated to the difficult task of reconcil-
ing those interests with current land use practice.2 Nevertheless,
Nelson's analysis does provide a fresh perspective, and indeed, wide-
ranging examination of zoning." Most impressively, Nelson is able to
look beyond the legal fictions employed in the exercise of the police
power and the debate surrounding the taking issue, to suggest a
system of private land use control that contains the promise of less
allocational inefficiency than the public control mechanism upon
which the proposal is founded.
Douglas W. Kmiec*
60. R. NELSON, supra note 6, at 219.
61. Nelson's proposal allows zoning controls to be redefined after the collec-
tive rights are transferred to the neighborhood association by a vote of 70 to 90 per-
cent of the association membership.Idi at 210. Fairness and individual liberty could be
accommodated with compensation or by requiring unanimous approval of the collective
rights to be administered by the association, whether the substance of those rights are
to be continued as they existed when administered by local government or in modified
form. In some cases Nelson suggests that compensation might be paid to owners of
properties adversely affected by a decision of a neighborhood association, although this
suggestion does not appear to include nonconsenting members of the association in
general. Furthermore, Nelson does not tell us how the compensation would be
measured or determined. Nelson also rejects unanimity as a "practical impossibility."
I& Nelson's concession to fairness is to provide an "upper limit beyond which collec-
tive authority could not go under any circumstances. This would involve matters
relating solely to the interior of individual properties." Id.
62. See B. ACHERMAN. supra note 4; Michelman, supra note 1; Berger, supra
note 1.
63. While this review has concentrated upon the aspects of the book dealing
with the reform proposal, Nelson also examines emerging state and federal land use
control pursuant to environmental legislation (Chapter 6) and growth controls (Chapter
7).
*Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.
Kmiec: Private Control of Collective Property Rights: Robert H. Nelson,
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979
